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Learning
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Abstract
Different levels of analysis provide different insights into behavior: computational-
level analyses determine the problem an organism must solve and algorithmic-
level analyses determine the mechanisms that drive behavior. However, many
attempts to model behavior are pitched at a single level of analysis. Research
into human and animal learning provides a prime example, with some researchers
using computational-level models to understand the sensitivity organisms display
to environmental statistics but other researchers using algorithmic-level models
to understand organisms’ trial order effects, including effects of primacy and re-
cency. Recently, attempts have been made to bridge these two levels of analysis.
Locally Bayesian Learning (LBL) creates a bridge by taking a view inspired by
evolutionary psychology: Our minds are composed of modules that are each indi-
vidually Bayesian but communicate with restricted messages. A different inspira-
tion comes from computer science and statistics: Our brains are implementing the
algorithms developed for approximating complex probability distributions. We
show that these different inspirations for how to bridge levels of analysis are not
necessarily in conflict by developing a computational justification for LBL. We
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demonstrate that a scheme that maximizes computational fidelity while using a
restricted factorized representation produces the trial order effects that motivated
the development of LBL. This scheme uses the same modular motivation as LBL,
passing messages about the attended cues between modules, but does not use the
rapid shifts of attention considered key for the LBL approximation. This work il-
lustrates a new way of tying together psychological and computational constraints.
Keywords: rational approximations; locally Bayesian learning; trial order effects
Our goal when we model behavior depends on the level of analysis. If we
analyze behavior at Marr (1982)’s computational level, then we aim to deter-
mine the problem that people are attempting to solve. Or, as more often found
in psychology, we might be interested in the mechanism that drives behavior,
placing us at Marr (1982)’s algorithmic level. In human and animal learning, both
computational-level (Courville et al., 2005; Danks et al., 2003; Dayan et al., 2000)
and algorithmic-level models (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce
& Hall, 1980) have been developed. Models developed at different levels of analy-
sis have different strengths and this can be seen in how these models of human and
animal learning are applied: computational-level approaches are used to explain
how organisms are sensitive to complex statistics of the environment (De Houwer
& Beckers, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2005; Shanks & Darby, 1998) and algorithmic-
level models are used to explain how organisms are sensitive to the presentation
order of trials (Chapman, 1991; Hershberger, 1986; Medin & Edelson, 1988).
The computational and algorithmic levels provide different perspectives on
model development, but an explanation is more complete if it works at both lev-
els. Computational-level models that ignore the process can struggle with mak-
ing fine-grained predictions (Sakamoto et al., 2008) and algorithmic-level mod-
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els that ignore the computational level risk making incorrect or no predictions
for task variants (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009; Sanborn et al., 2013). A clas-
sic way to combine computational- and algorithmic-level insights is to begin with
an algorithmic-level model developed to fit human behavior and then investigate
its computational-level properties (Ashby & Alfonso-Reese, 1995; Gigerenzer &
Todd, 1999). This is not the only possible direction, and recently researchers have
begun at the computational level of analysis and then worked toward understand-
ing the algorithm (Griffiths et al., 2012; Sanborn et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2010).
Identifying the algorithm to associate with a computational-level model adds both
psychological plausibility and explanatory power – computational-level models
often are intractable, so the algorithm can provide a computationally tractable
approximation while also explaining behavior that differs from predictions of the
computational-level model as the result of the approximation. A major open ques-
tion is how to select an approximation algorithm from the vast set of all algo-
rithms, and again here human and animal learning provides examples of how this
can be done.
Locally Bayesian Learning (LBL; Kruschke, 2006b) is one recent approach
to bridging the computational and algorithmic levels in human and animal learn-
ing. LBL uses an approximation to a computational-level model to both improve
computational tractability as well as better fit human trial order behavior. A driv-
ing motivation of LBL is a view inspired by evolutionary psychology: there are
modular processes in the mind that have co-evolved. LBL assumes that each of
these modules performs correct probabilistic updating, but each model must make
due with only the information from messages it receives from other modules. By
restricting the messages passed between modules, the predictions of LBL differ
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from that of the computational-level model it is based upon, Globally Bayesian
Learning (GBL). LBL, unlike GBL, is able to successfully predict several effects
of trial order on behavior, such as highlighting and the difference between forward
and backward blocking. These effects are challenging because there are aspects
for which earlier trials have greater influence, known as primacy effects, and as-
pects for which later trials have greater influence, known as recency effects, but
computational-level models of behavior generally weight all trials equally.
Daw et al. (2008) motivate a bridge between the computational and algorith-
mic levels in a different way. Like with LBL, the approximation to the computational-
level model is chosen because it reduces computational complexity while pro-
viding a better fit to human trial order behavior. However, computational in-
stead of psychological considerations are used to select the approximation: A
sequential updating algorithm is chosen from those that have been used in com-
puter science and statistics to approximate complex probability distributions. The
computational-level model is the Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960), which is a gen-
eralization of standard associative learning models (Dayan et al., 2000; Dayan
& Kakade, 2001; Kruschke, 2008; Sutton, 1992), and it is approximated using
Assumed Density Filtering (ADF; Boyen & Koller, 1998), an algorithm for se-
quential updating of a probability distribution. ADF approximates the full joint
posterior distribution, which can contain dependencies between variables, with a
factorized distribution that assumes the variables are independent. By using this
and other approximations, the Kalman filter model is able to produce the same
trial order effects that LBL does1.
1Kalman filters were also used in a later version of the LBL by arranging two Kalman filters in
a hierarchy and passing restricted messages between them (Kruschke, 2006a; Kruschke & Denton,
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Both of the above motivations for bridging the computational and algorith-
mic levels have been criticized, each for not providing enough constraints. The
restricted messages used by LBL have been criticized for having no specific com-
putational justification (Daw et al., 2008), and thus leaving a great deal of freedom
in selecting the content of messages and how they are passed between modules.
In contrast, Kruschke (2010) argued that choosing an approximation from com-
puter science and statistics is not very constraining, as there are a large number of
plausible approximations from computer science and statistics that can be used.
Here we take the view that these motivations are not necessarily in conflict
and that both psychological and computational motivations can be used to guide
development of bridges between levels of analysis. We first describe LBL and
review the trial order effects that are difficult for Bayesian models to produce.
We then note that LBL constrains computation by assuming that a factorized pos-
terior distribution is used to approximate the full posterior distribution on each
trial. Using only this computational constraint and a standard measure of distance
between probability distributions, we identify the message passing scheme that
best approximates the full posterior distribution. This approximation is a form
of ADF, the same approximation used to produce some trial order effects in the
Kalman filter model. We show that the accumulation of approximation errors
from a sequentially factorized representation alone produces these trial order ef-
fects, and that the rapid switching of the attended cues in the LBL messages is not
necessary. We next give an example of where the predictions of LBL and the se-
quentially factorized representation differ. Finally, we discuss the implications for
2010).
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attention, compare our approach to other approximations to rational models ap-
plied to human cognition, and discuss the prospects for integrating computational
and psychological motivations.
1. Computational-Level Models of Learning
In human and animal learning studies, the problem that the organism faces is
how to use a set of input cues x (e.g., lights or tones presented to an animal) to
predict the outcome t (e.g., the food an animal receives). The statistical approach
to this prediction problem is to view the relationship between the input cues and
outcome as a probability distribution, p(t,x). A full statistical treatment explains
the joint probability of outcomes and input cues on a single trial p(t,x), but we
take as a starting point models of the conditional distribution p(t|x), which is all
that is needed for prediction of the outcome if the input cues are observed.
Computational-level analyses require both a set of possible hypotheses and
a probability distribution over these hypotheses that describes the initial beliefs,
called the prior distribution. Here the hypotheses are the possible mappings be-
tween the input cues and outcomes. There are many possible mappings, but a
common choice is to start with outcomes that result from weighted sums of the
input cues, as weighted sums are the basis of the classic Rescorla-Wagner (RW;
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) model. A prior distribution is then put over the possible
weights, which completes the specification of the computational-level model.
One approach in this vein is the Kalman filter model (Dayan et al., 2000;
Dayan & Kakade, 2001; Kalman, 1960; Kruschke, 2008; Sutton, 1992). The
Kalman filter takes a weighted sum of input cues and maps it onto a Gaussian
probability of a outcome. It also often assumes that the weights change over time,
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giving a built-in recency effect to the computational-level model because earlier
data is less relevant than newer data. However, the Kalman filter model does not
have a mechanism to produce primacy effects.
A second approach is GBL (Kruschke, 2006b), which begins with a model
that has two levels of weighted sums. A schematic of the model is shown in
Figure 1A. Unlike the Kalman filter or RW, GBL includes an early component that
determines which input cues to attend to when computing the outcome prediction.
The predicted outcome strength t is a sigmoid function of the weighted sum of the
k attended cues y,
t = sig(Woy) (1)
where Woy is the dot product (element-wise multiplication and then sum) of the
k×1 vector representing the output weights, Wo, and the k×1 vector representing
the attended cues, y. The weights were allowed to take discrete values for the sake
of simplicity by (Kruschke, 2006b). Each output weight was allowed to take the
values of−5, 0, or 5. The weights were combined with the activity of the attention
cues and put through Equation 1, and raised to the power of 1.
Likewise, each attended cue’s activation is a sigmoid function of a weighted
sum of the input values,
y = sig(Whx) (2)
where Whx is the matrix product between a k× k hidden weight matrix, Wh, and a
k×1 vector of inputs, x. There were an equal number of input and attended cues,
which were linked with one of two types of weights. Excitatory weights could
take the value of 4 or 6 and inhibitory weights could take the value of 0 or −4.
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Each input cue was linked to one attended cue with excitatory weights (in a one-
to-one mapping) and linked to every other attended cue with inhibitory weights.
As a result of this mapping, each attended cue could be identified with an input
cue. To compute the activation of an attended cue, the weights of the present input
were summed and put through a sigmoid (i.e., logistic) function as in Equation 2,
and raised to the power of 6. This last operation was chosen by Kruschke (2006b)
so that activation ranged from nearly zero to nearly one.
Given this specification, the learning done by the model is fixed. Bayes’ rule
is used to update the probability distributions over the hidden weights and hidden
attentional cues based on the trials that have been experienced
p(Wh,Wo,y | x, t) ∝ p(t |Wo,y)p(y |Wh,x)p(Wo,Wh). (3)
The prior distribution on the output and hidden weights was independent,
p(Wo,Wh) = p(Wo)p(Wh). The prior p(Wh) was a discrete uniform over all possi-
ble combinations of hidden weights. The prior p(Wo) over sets of output weights
was set to favor sets of weights that had more values of zero: a product of pseudo-
Gaussian distributions2 (φ) with mean zero and standard deviation five for each
weight wi in the set: ∏iφ(wi). Note that this is the prior for the first trial. Through-
out this paper we consider the predictions of the model relative to a single trial, rel-
egating information from previous trials to the prior to simplify the notation.The
prior distribution over weights p(Wh,Wo) is set to the posterior distribution from
the previous trial.
2The discrete weights were assigned probability proportional to their density under a Gaussian
distribution.
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GBL learns in a probabilistically correct fashion from experience, but it is
a poor fit to the experimental data: unlike the Kalman filter it is necessarily a
stationary model and produces neither a primacy nor a recency effect. GBL can
also quickly become intractable as the number of input cues grow, as it represents
the probability of every combination of possible values of hidden weights and
output weights. For k input cues and m outcomes, there are 2k
2
possibilities for Wh
and 3km possibilities for Wo, yielding 2k
2 ∗3km possibilities for the combinations of
weights. As an illustration of how quickly the number of possibilities grows with
the number of input cues, one input cue and one outcome produce six possible
combinations of weights, but three input cues and one outcome produces over
thirteen thousand weight combinations.
2. Locally Bayesian Learning
LBL is an approximation to GBL that both decreases the required computation
and produces human-like trial order effects. LBL splits the network graph of GBL
into two modules, as shown in Figure 1B. Each module is meant to represent a
psychological process: the lower module takes input cues and maps it to attended
cues, and the upper module maps the attended cues to the outcome. Each module
is self-contained and only represents a probability distribution over its own set of
weights. Splitting GBL into modules results in a much smaller representational
complexity, instead of 2k
2 ∗3km possibilities, there are now 2k2 +3km possibilities
that need to be separately represented. In our illustration, three input cues and one
outcome produce 539 combinations of weight values in LBL, less than 4% of the
9
Figure 1: Diagrams of Globally Bayesian Learning (GBL), Locally Bayesian Learning (LBL),
and Factorized Bayesian Learning (FBL). Input cues x are weighted by hidden weights Wh and
transformed to produce attended cues y. Attended cues y are weighted by output weights Wo and
transformed to produce outcomes t. Multiple outcome nodes are possible as shown here, though
only one was required for the tasks we model. The hidden weights Wh, attended cues y, and
output weights Wo are not observed and are instead inferred. In GBL, all of the hidden variables
are inferred together. LBL splits GBL into two modules with copies of the attended cues y in
each module. Messages are passed back and forth between the copies of the attended cues y,
the expected value E(y|x) is passed upward and the single yˆ that maximizes the probability of
the outcome is passed backward. FBL uses the same modules as LBL, but the messages passed
between modules are distributions over the attended cues rather than a single set of attended cues.
combinations used in GBL for the same number of input cues and outcomes3.
Each LBL module uses Bayes’ rule to update its own representation, but each
is prevented from observing the entire state of the environment or the probability
distribution represented in the other module. Instead, a module receives some in-
3Continuous representations could also be used to reduce the complexity of the hypothesis
space, such as in Kruschke & Denton (2010).
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formation indirectly in the form of messages passed from the other module. Mes-
sages moving forward from the lower module to the upper contain the expected
value of the attended cues E(y|x). The upper module only observes the expected
values of the attended cues and is blind to the input cues. Once the outcome t
has been given, the output weights Wo are updated to be p(Wo|E(y|x), t), instead
of the p(Wo|x, t) as they would be in GBL. The expected values of the attended
cues given the input are used in the place of the probability distribution over the
attended cues given the input.
Messages passed downward from the upper module to the lower module are
of a different type. First the output weights are updated, then the value of y that
maximizes the probability of the outcome t is passed downwards to the lower
module,
yˆ = argmax
y∗
∑
Wo
p(t|Wo,y∗)p(Wo|E(y|x), t) (4)
The lower module only observes yˆ and the input cues, so the hidden weight
prior p(Wh) is updated to be p(Wh|x, yˆ). The restricted messages passed in LBL
and the trial-by-trial updating of the representation result in its predictions de-
pending on the order of the training trials, which we discuss in the next section.
3. Trial Order Effects
Two trial order effects in particular have so far proved difficult for computational-
level modeling: the highlighting effect and the difference in strength between for-
ward and backward blocking.
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3.1. Highlighting
Because people are sensitive to the statistics of the environment, we expect
that the frequencies of different outcomes would play a role in people’s judgments:
a higher frequency outcome should produce a stronger relationship than a lower
frequency outcome. However, people can display unusual responses to the relative
frequency of trials in an experiment, such as the inverse base-rate effect (Gluck
& Bower, 1988; Medin & Edelson, 1988). The inverse-base rate effect occurs
following two types of training trials. In the first, two input cues, I and Pe, are
associated with an outcome E. We will write this as I.Pe→ E. The second set
of trials pairs one of the old input cues, I, with a new input cue Pl, and a new
outcome L. The labels associated with the input cues and outcomes indicate their
roles (which participants must learn from experience): input cue I is an imperfect
predictor, input cue Pe is a perfect predictor of early outcome E, and input cue Pl
is a perfect predictor of late outcome L. When given a test trial with input cue I or
with conflicting input cues Pe and Pl, it is reasonable to expect that the response
chosen would depend on the relative frequencies of the two types of trials. If there
were more I.Pe→ E trials than I.Pl→ L trials, then participants should respond E
given input cue I or the conflicting input cues Pe.Pl. However, Medin & Edelson
(1988) found that while participants chose the higher frequency outcome if given
input cue I, they chose the lower frequency outcome if given the conflicting input
cues Pe.Pl.
Later work showed that the inverse base-rate effect arises even if the relative
frequency of training trial types is equated, but more I.Pe→ E trials are presented
early in training (Collins et al., 2011; Kruschke, 1996, 2009; Kruschke et al.,
2005; Medin & Bettger, 1991; Sewell & Lewandowsky, in press). As a result, the
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inverse base rate effect has been renamed highlighting, the name following from
an attentional explanation of the effect. Participants first learn that input cues I
and Pe equally predict outcome E, because they are both equally predictive of the
outcome in the I.Pe→ E trials. However, the later I.Pl → L trials demonstrate
the ambiguity of input cue I and highlight the relationship between input cue Pl
and outcome L, so participants heavily weight this latter relationship. During test,
there is both a primacy effect and a recency effect. The primacy effect is that I has
a stronger relationship with outcome E. The recency effect is that if input cues Pe
and Pl compete against each other, outcome L is chosen because Pl has a stronger
relationship to L than Pe has to E (Kruschke, 1996).
Kruschke (2006a,b) demonstrated that highlighting was an extremely chal-
lenging effect for Bayesian models of learning because of the equal number of
training trials of each type. The predictions of GBL for two types of highlighting
designs are shown in Figure 2. The first design was used in Kruschke (2006b)
to demonstrate the models: seven trials of I.Pe→ E followed by seven trials of
I.Pl→ L. The second design follows more closely that used in Kruschke (2009,
design given in the Appendix), in which the human data showed a strong high-
lighting effect.
Unlike GBL, the restricted nature of the messages in LBL causes it to pre-
dict a robust highlighting effect that matches human data, as shown in Figure 2.
The prediction of highlighting was explained by attention to cues to that rapidly
switched between trial types, like in the description of highlighting above. The
message passed backward from the upper module to the lower module consisted
of attended cues I′ and Pe′ in the early trials4, so I′ is activated on these trials and
4Each hidden attended cue can be identified with a specific input cue because there is a one-
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is thus associated with E. However on the second block of I.Pl → L trials, as I
already strongly activates E, the attended cue that is maximally consistent with
the output weights is Pl′ alone so I′ is not activated. As a result, I more strongly
activates E and Pl more strongly activates L than Pe activates E, producing the
highlighting effect (Kruschke, 2006b).
3.2. Forward and Backward Blocking
The experimental effect of blocking demonstrates how input cues compete
with each other during learning (Kamin, 1968). As a comparison, control trials
consist of two input cues and a outcome, A.B→ R, and participants believe that
B predicts R with some moderate strength. Forward blocking occurs if this set of
training trials is preceded by a set of training trials in which A→ R. The initial
learning of A→ R blocks the establishment of a relationship of B with R in the
A.B→ R trials, as A by itself was sufficient to predict the outcome. After the two
blocks of learning, participants believe that B predicts R only weakly.
Forward blocking is a straightforward prediction of RW, but a slight change
to the design complicates associative explanations. In backward blocking, the
order of the blocks is reversed so that the A.B→ R trials occur before the A→ R
trials. Here the prediction of R from B is also reduced, though this effect is not
as larger or as robust as forward blocking (Beckers et al., 2005; Chapman, 1991;
Kruschke & Blair, 2000; Lovibond et al., 2003; Melchers et al., 2006; Shanks,
1985; Vandorpe et al., 2007). Essentially, participants retrospectively re-evaluate
the strength of the relationship between B and R, reducing it because of the later
to-one mapping of positive weights between input cues to attended cues. All other weights were
between input cues and attended cues are non-positive.
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A→ R trials. Backward blocking is not predicted by RW and so has been taken as
evidence for statistical accounts of learning, though modified associative accounts
are able to predict it (Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994).
Backward blocking can be explained by Bayesian models of learning (Gopnik
et al., 2004; Sobel et al., 2004; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2003), but a difference
in strength between forward and backward blocking presents difficulties for many
Bayesian models because the two designs differ only in the order of presentation
of the training trials (but see Daw et al., 2008; Dayan & Kakade, 2001). Many
experiments have shown a trace of this effect (Chapman, 1991; Kruschke & Blair,
2000), and it was shown to be statistically reliable in (Vandorpe et al., 2007). The
difference in the size of the effects in this study was found to be between 10% and
20% of the range of the scale.
The predictions of GBL and LBL for forward and backward blocking are
shown in Figure 3, using the same parameters as Kruschke (2006b). The control
condition consisted of seven trials of A.B→ R, the forward blocking condition
consisted of seven trials of A→ R followed by seven control trials, and the back-
ward blocking condition consisted of seven control trials followed by seven trials
of A→ R. GBL shows the same decrement for both forward and backward block-
ing relative to control trials. LBL does predict a stronger influence of forward than
backward blocking, which again was attributed to passing the maximally consis-
tent value from the upper module to the lower module (Kruschke, 2006b). In
forward blocking the initial block of A→ R trials provides no information about
what the outcome should be to input cue B, and thus there remains a good pos-
sibility that B′→¬R, where ¬R is no outcome. Given the uncertainty about the
outcome to B, when the later A.B→ R trials appear it is best to attend to A and
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ignore B. This results in a weak relationship between B and R, as B is ignored
during trials in which the relationship could be strengthened. In contrast, in back-
ward blocking the maximally consistent message passed from the upper module
to the lower module in the first block of backward blocking is to attend to both
input cues, strengthening the relationship during this block of training trials. As a
result, for LBL, B predicts R more strongly in backward than forward blocking.
4. Message Passing and Factorized Representations
The match between LBL and human trial order effects is due to a message
passing scheme that was chosen on an ad-hoc basis. There are many possible
schemes for passing messages between modules, varying in aspects such as which
content is passed, in which sequence and at which loss of information. Despite
the multiplicity of possible mechanisms, we argue that there are some general
principles that can strongly constrain the possible algorithmic constructions for
a computational model. In this section, we initially discuss how the message
passing scheme of LBL approximates GBL. We then set the stage to introduce an
alternative based on a more fundamental set of algorithmic principles, with the
goal of largely retaining the predictive power of LBL without seemingly ad-hoc
combinations of approximations.
To understand the design choices behind LBL, let us first summarize how
GBL works. For GBL, the posterior distribution over the weights, p(Wo,Wh|x, t),
does not factorize into independent contributions from each of the weights, as in
p(Wo|x, t)p(Wh|x, t). Instead,
p(Wo,Wh|x, t) =∑
y
p(Wo|y, t)p(Wh|y,x)p(y|x, t). (5)
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GBL has a distribution over the possible attended cues, y, and this range
of possibilities means that the posterior distribution does not factorize. A non-
factorized distribution requires more memory to represent, and complicates up-
dates when new data points are observed. However, we can see in Equation 5
what would happen if y were fixed at a single value: the summation would dis-
appear and the posterior distribution would factorize. Exploiting this fact, the
representation learned by LBL has the following structure:
1. Consider collapsing our uncertainty over y using an estimate y˜, which is
assumed to be known with certainty (i.e., p(y˜|x, t) = 1)
2. To further simplify computation, do not construct a representation with the
structure p(Wo,Wh|x, t) ≈ p(Wo|y˜, t)p(Wh|y˜,x): instead, use two different
estimates where p(Wo,Wh|x, t) ≈ p(Wo|y˜1, t)p(Wh|y˜2,x). This means com-
putation can be carried separately within two different modules, one for
each factor
3. Under this formulation, use one estimate y˜i generated within one module to
compute the other estimate y˜ j
Within the choices provides by this framework, LBL can be thought as hav-
ing a single hypothesis, though different in the upwards and downwards mes-
sages, passed between modules. LBL’s posterior distribution of p(Wo,Wh|x, t)
is a factorized distribution and can be written as the product of the individual
weight distributions p(Wo|E(y|x), t)p(Wh|yˆ,x). LBL starts with a factorized prior
p(Wo,Wh) = p(Wo)p(Wh), and generates a factorized posterior p(Wo,Wh | t,x) ≡
pnew(Wo)pnew(Wh) ≡ p(Wo|E(y|x), t)p(Wh|yˆ,x). This probability distribution is
then treated as a new prior for the next data point and the process is iterated.
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Approximations that sequentially factorize the posterior distribution after each
data point have been explored in computer science and statistics. This class of
approximations is known as Assumed Density Filtering (ADF; Boyen & Koller,
1998). In ADF, the posterior distribution over parameters is approximated with
a simpler distribution after each new data point is observed. This approximate
posterior is used as the prior when processing the next point.
While LBL’s message passing scheme falls within the class of ADF algo-
rithms, there is still the question of whether LBL is a good approximation to
the full posterior distribution. We can test LBL’s message passing scheme by
examining it within Minka (2005)’s unified framework for generating approxi-
mations, which encompasses and generalizes several techniques from machine
learning, statistics, statistical physics, and information theory. One key aspect of
this framework is that the choice of approximation is based on picking the ap-
proximation that is “closest” to p(Wo,Wh | t,x) according to some definition of
similarity between probability functions.
Although this similarity-maximization (or, analogously, divergence-minimization)
principle might sound too broad, LBL does not seem to obey it. Namely, we have
been unable to find any divergence measure D(p,q)where, for p= p(Wo,Wh | t,x)
we have q= pnew(Wo)pnew(Wh) as the factorized distribution that minimizes D(p,q).
LBL’s message passing scheme may not be justified by a divergence measure,
but we can identify a message passing scheme that is justified. This removes
several of the degrees of freedom of LBL’s framework: we do not have a choice
of different estimators of y, and how they are computed as a function of the other.
The framework is predicated on the choice of a divergence measure. We adopt the
standard procedure of ADF: considering all factorized distributions q(Wo,Wh) ≡
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qo(Wo)qh(Wh), find the one that is closest to the true posterior p(Wo,Wh | x, t) ≡
px,t(Wo,Wh). We term this approach Factorized Bayesian Learning (FBL) and a
schematic of this model is shown in Figure 1C.
Our choice of a message passing scheme depends on our measure of diver-
gence. We propose that the choice of q should be the one that minimizes the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. KL divergence is a popular criterion for choos-
ing approximations, since KL(p || q) = 0 if and only if p = q, and is positive
otherwise (Minka, 2001). It has a long history in information theory (Cover &
Thomas, 1991), and has an interpretation based on coding: if a string/sample is
generated from distribution p, but encoded using a scheme based on q, the KL
divergence is how many extra bits (or nats in our case, because we use base e)
are needed to encode the message relative to the optimal code based on p. KL
divergence can be written as
KL(p || q) =
∫ ∫
p(Wo,Wh | x, t) ln p(Wo,Wh | x, t)qo(Wo)qh(Wh) dWodWh (6)
where the target approximation q(Wo,Wh) takes the shape qo(Wo)qh(Wh). The
distribution over hidden attended cues y is implicit, since the problem of choos-
ing qo(Wo)qh(Wh) to minimize Equation 6 is equivalent to choosing the one that
minimizes
−
∫ ∫ ∫
p(Wo,Wh,y | x, t) ln [qo(Wo)qh(Wh)]dWodWhdy (7)
Minimizing Equation 6 with respect to qo(·) and qh(·) results in qo(Wo) =
p(Wo | x, t) and qh(Wh) = p(Wh | x, t) regardless of the functional form of p(· | x, t)
(Minka, 2001). This can be shown as follows. For simplicity, assume all random
variables are discrete, as this will be the case in our case study. Then Equation 7
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can be rewritten as
−∑
Wo
p(Wo | x, t) lnqo(Wo)−∑
Wh
p(Wh | x, t) lnqh(Wh) (8)
We have to optimize this function with respect to the entries of qo(Wo) and
qh(Wh) such that such entries are non-negative and ∑Wo qo(Wo) = 1, ∑Wh qh(Wh) =
1. Using Lagrange multipliers for this constrained optimization problem and ig-
noring for now the non-negativity constraints, this gives the following objective
function:
−∑
Wo
p(Wo | x, t) lnqo(Wo)−∑
Wh
p(Wh | x, t) lnqh(Wh)+λo(∑
Wo
qo(Wo)−1)+λh(∑
Wh
qh(Wh)−1)
(9)
Taking the derivative of Equation 9 with respect to an arbitrary entry qo(Wo),
we obtain
−p(Wo | x, t)/qo(Wo)+λo = 0 (10)
which implies qo(Wo) ∝ p(Wo | x, t) for all values Wo. Because ∑Wo qo(Wo) = 1,
it follows that qo(Wo) = p(Wo | x, t). The reasoning is analogous when deriving
qh(Wh) = p(Wh | x, t).
The role of message-passing and prior factorization have algorithmic implica-
tions due to the calculation of the marginals. For the output weights,
p(Wo|x, t) ∝ ∑Wh∑y p(t |Wo,y)p(y |Wh,x)p(Wo)p(Wh)
= p(Wo)∑y p(t |Wo,y)∑Wh p(y |Wh,x)p(Wh)
≡ p(Wo)∑y p(t |Wo,y)mx(y)
where mx(y)≡ ∑Wh p(y |Wh,x)p(Wh) is the message passed from the lower mod-
ule to the upper module that encapsulates all the information content provided by
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x for a given value of y. It is possible to decouple this module from the output
module only because the prior over Wo and Wh factorizes as p(Wo)p(Wh).
Analogously,
p(Wh|x, t) ∝ ∑Wo∑y p(t |Wo,y)p(y |Wh,x)p(Wo)p(Wh)
= p(Wh)∑y p(y |Wh,x)∑Wo p(t |Wo,y)p(Wo)
≡ p(Wh)∑y p(y |Wh,x)mt(y)
where mt(y)≡∑Wo p(t |Wo,y)p(Wo) is the message passed from the upper module
to the lower module that encapsulates all the information content provided by t for
a given value of y.
The approximated posterior given by the optimal qo(Wo)qh(Wh) is the new
prior when processing the next data point. Hence the prior used at the beginning
of each trial is always factorized. The approximation used in LBL produces a non-
standard projection of the true posterior into the space of factorized distributions,
so FBL will always be as good or better than LBL in the KL divergence sense, all
without the need of choosing a way of collapsing y. An example of a full posterior
distribution and the factorized approximation made by FBL is shown in Figure 4.
Given the generality of the KL divergence metric, the main degree of freedom
in the algorithmic procedure of FBL is the choice of approximation by a factorized
distribution. This is shared with LBL and is motivated by requiring, in general,
exponentially fewer bits of information (as a function of the number of parame-
ters) to be represented than a full joint distribution, and by allowing a message
passing formulation when calculating marginals. And, as we will show next, this
factorization property will imply artifacts of reasoning that match human behav-
ior.
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5. Factorized Representations for Trial Order Effects
Surprisingly, Figure 2 shows that FBL produces the highlighting effect for the
design in Kruschke (2006b) and that the size of the effect matches human data
if the model is trained with the same number of stimuli that participants were.
Figure 3 shows that FBL also produces the trial order effect for blocking. The
FBL highlighting effect and the FBL blocking effect can be better matched to the
size in the human data by adjusting the parameters of the model5, but we used
the original parameters to demonstrate that the FBL produces the same qualitative
effects as LBL with the same parameters. Instead of an explanation that is due
to passing the maximally consistent message backwards, this effect is due to the
more basic separation of GBL into two modules and the sequential approximation
of trials that then results.
Effects of approximation have a long history in comparisons of the most gen-
eral artificial algorithmic system, the digital computer, against abstract compu-
tational models such as the Turing machine. The field of numerical analysis, in
particular, tackles the issue on how problems of mathematical analysis can be
solved in practice, considering the accumulation of errors due to the sequential
processing of numerical operations using a digital representation. One can, for
instance, analyze the computational complexity of a procedure for matrix inver-
sion (Cormen et al., 2009), but its numerical stability depends upon the control
5Changing the parameters to fit highlighting data must be done carefully. For some parameter
settings, the GBL does predict a highlighting effect because the critical test items I and Pe.Pl
consist of different numbers of cues, and inhibition only occurs if more than one cue is presented.
For example, if the prior on inhibition is strong, the single cue I has no other cue to inhibit it and
so favors E, but strong inhibition between cues makes Pe.Pl favor L.
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of rounding errors that accumulates as the sequence of steps in the algorithm is
followed. ADF, and in particular FBL, uses an approximation as input to the next
approximation. As the literature of numerical analysis shows us, a combination
of biases and sequential processing might lead to results that do not match what
the computational model entails.
ADF gives the best approximation with respect to a given prior. However,
since in a sequential update scheme the “prior” represents compiled evidence of
previous observations, errors will propagate. Minka (2001) suggests, for instance,
that ADF is particularly prone to bad approximations of marginals if the input
sequence of data points differs considerably from what it should be obtained by
a randomized sequence. Hence, FBL dispenses with the necessity of a Kalman
filter formulation, since an ordering effect is automatically accounted for by ap-
proximation errors.
An example that will prove useful for explaining both the highlighting and
blocking predictions is shown in Figure 5. GBL and FBL both begin with the
same prior distribution and are updated with either data that produce “complex”
likelihoods or data that produce “simple” likelihoods. The weights are dependent
in the complex likelihood, but independent in the simple likelihood. If FBL and
GBL are updated with a simple likelihood, they produce the same posterior distri-
butions, as can be seen in the first and second posterior distributions if the simple
likelihood is presented first. However, when GBL and FBL are updated with a
complex likelihood, their joint posterior distributions diverge.
Especially interesting is the case in which GBL and FBL are updated mul-
tiple times with a complex likelihood. Here not only do the joint distributions
diverge, the sequential updating procedure also results in the marginal posterior
23
distributions diverging. The final marginal distributions depend on whether FBL
is updated with the two simple likelihoods first or updated with the two complex
likelihoods first. The difference between the final marginal distributions (shown at
the bottom of Figure 5) is small for such a small number of training trials, but the
most likely value is smaller and the other values larger if the complex likelihoods
are presented first compared to if the simple likelihoods are presented first. As
we explain below, this is what drives both the highlighting and blocking effects.
Unlike in the LBL, the trial order effects do not arise from the rapid nature of
changes to which cues are attended to, but instead follow directly from computa-
tional considerations.
5.1. Predicting Highlighting
We present an example of how the posterior distribution changes in FBL in
Figure 6. The final posterior distribution is a result of training with an early block
of seven I.Pe→ E trials followed by a block of seven I.Pl→ L trials (model pre-
dictions are shown in Figure 2). The hypothesis space of FBL is summarized in
Figure 6 to make the relevant patterns easier to see. The vertical dimension of
each plot shows possible hypotheses about the hidden weights, grouping those
hypotheses that do and do not result in the attended cues exceeding an arbitrary
threshold of 0.5 in activation. The horizontal axis groups the probabilities of the
output weights by showing the probability of the largest weights for one hypoth-
esis or the other, excluding the probabilities of the indifference weight. The two
rows separately summarize the hypotheses relevant to I.Pe and I.Pl. This is not
a partition of the hypotheses, some of the hypotheses about I are reused between
the two rows of plots and other hypotheses about indifference in output weights
do not contribute at all, but it provides a useful summary.
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The likelihoods for the first and second set of training trials have the same
structure as those we used as examples in Figure 5. I.Pe→ E trials are presented
first, so the first seven likelihoods for I and Pe in the first row of the plot are
complex, where if only I is attended (activating its corresponding attended cue I′)
then both hypotheses in which I′→E are more likely than the hypothesis in which
I′→ L. Likewise, if only Pe is attended, then both hypotheses in which Pe′→ E
are more likely than the hypothesis in which Pe′→ L. However, the I.Pe→E trials
tell us nothing about Pl. So for the first likelihood of the I.Pl hypotheses, we learn
that I′→ E is more likely than I′→ L, but it has no interactions with the attended
cues, a likelihood which is simple. The second seven likelihoods are exactly the
reverse. The I.Pl→ L training trials gives us a likelihood that is complex between
hidden and output weights for I.Pl hypotheses, but is simple for I.Pe hypotheses.
This gives us the same orderings of simple and complex likelihoods as in Figure 5.
As a result, we find the same effect on the marginal distributions that we found
in Figure 5. When the complex likelihood is first, then the first column is reduced
and the third column is boosted compared to when the simple likelihood is first.
We can see the highlighting prediction arise from this difference in the marginals6.
The combined marginal in which I′→ E are greater than the combined marginals
in which I′→ L, giving the prediction for the irrelevant input cue. For Pe.Pl, the
combined marginals in which Pe′ → E are less than the combined marginals in
which Pl′→ L, giving the prediction of Pe.Pl→ L.
6We ignore the hidden weights here because the test input cue I alone means that there is no
cross-cue inhibition, so I is likely activated. Also, the test input cues Pe.Pl are a novel combination,
so inhibition should not have changed much from baseline.
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5.2. Predicting Blocking
FBL predicts a difference in strength between forward and backward block-
ing for the same reason: the ordering of complex and simple likelihoods. Figure 7
summarizes the hypothesis space for FBL for blocking. Again, the vertical dimen-
sion of each plot shows possible hypotheses about the hidden weights, grouping
those hypotheses that do and do not result in the attended cues exceeding an arbi-
trary threshold of 0.5 in activation. The horizontal axis groups the output weights
by showing the probability of the largest weight and smallest weight for reward.
The two rows separately summarize backward and forward blocking. Hypotheses
about indifference in output weights are not included in this figure.
Like highlighting, the likelihoods for blocking are either complex or sim-
ple, though here the complex or simple likelihoods apply to the entire hypothesis
space. In backward blocking the first set of trials are A.B→R, so the combinations
of hypotheses that lead to a greater prediction of R are given greater likelihood.
This leads to a dependence between hidden and output weights because if only A′
is activated, then A′→ R is more likely than B′→ R, and the relative ordering of
the probabilities reverses if B′ is activated. In forward blocking the first likelihood
is simple. We are only learning about A with A→ R trials, so we do not learn
anything about which cues should be attended.
The end result again is that FBL produces lower marginals for the first column
and higher marginals for the third column for the complex likelihood first com-
pared to the simple likelihood first. This produces the blocking trial order effect
as well. The probability of B′→ R is higher for backward blocking than forward
blocking as a result, reproducing the experimental effect.
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6. Differences Between Locally Bayesian Learning and Factorized Bayesian
Learning
We have shown FBL is a more principled approximation than LBL and here
we demonstrate how the more principled approximation can lead to different pre-
dictions. The example we use is a classic in both the artificial intelligence and
the human and animal learning literatures: the exclusive-OR (XOR) problem for
which the learner is trained to respond to cues singly but not in combination. XOR
is a simple version of a nonlinearly separable problem that cannot be learned by
a single layer linear network (Minsky & Papert, 1969), but has been shown to be
learnable by both animals and humans (also known as negative patterning; Pavlov,
1927; Harris & Livesey, 2008; Harris et al., 2008; Rescorla, 1972, 1973).
A simple XOR design was used in which we trained the models on three types
of trials: the single cues T → R and U → R the compound cue T.U → 0. We
presented these cues in that order for seven repetitions and show the predictions
for GBL, LBL, and FBL in Figure 8. GBL and FBL were both able to learn that
the single cues were better associated with R than the compound cue. However,
LBL does not learn this distinction, predicting essentially the same outcome for
both the single and compound cues. This inability arises from choosing to train
the lower module to produce the attentional cues that maximize the probability of
the outcome. Even for the single cues T and U , the outcome is maximized if both
attentional cues T ′ and U ′ are activated. However, in order to predict a higher
response to the single cues than the compound cue the two cues must be trained
to inhibit one another when both are present. GBL and FBL can both learn this
inhibition scheme because they do not use the max message passed downward in
LBL.
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Of course a common way to attempt to account for XOR problems is to in-
troduce configural units (Minsky & Papert, 1969; Spence, 1952), and indeed Kr-
uschke (2006b) proposed this solution for LBL. There is some evidence that con-
figural units make the wrong sort of predictions for human and animal behav-
ior (Harris & Livesey, 2008; Harris et al., 2008), but if we allow them then this
demonstration serves to illustrate a difference between FBL and LBL that could
be potentially tested in experiments with more complex XOR designs.
7. Discussion
We have shown how a computationally justified version of LBL can be used to
produce human-like trial order effects, and additionally how the FBL potentially
better matches human behavior in XOR tasks. Here we investigate the implica-
tions for rapid shifts of attention, relate the approximation used in FBL to other
approximations hypothesized to be in use in the mind, discuss the hypothesis that
modularity corresponds to factorization, and conclude.
7.1. Implications for Rapid Shifts of Attention
The success of LBL in producing the effect of highlighting and the difference
between forward and backward blocking was attributed to rapid shifts of attention
(Kruschke, 2006b), like those used in the error-driven connnectionist model EXIT
(Kruschke, 2001a,b). These rapid shifts were identified with the maximization
messages passed backward from the upper module to the lower module. Later
work with the Kalman filter model demonstrated that rapid shifts of attention were
not necessary to produce highlighting, because it could be produced with a single
layer network instead, though the approximation used in the single layer network
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needed to be complex (as discussed below) to produce the blocking results as well
(Daw et al., 2008).
The current results go beyond these to demonstrate that even in the two layer
network of the LBL, in which the output is based on attended cues rather than the
observed cues, rapid shifts of attention are not necessary to predict highlighting
or the difference between forward and backward blocking. Instead, FBL predicts
these results using only the factorization of the probability distributions over the
layers of the weights of the network. The message passed backwards from the
upper module to the lower module is not a maximization message, but is instead
the actual marginal distribution of the attended cues given the outcome of the trial.
This indicates that the separation between the modules imposed by the factoriza-
tion is sufficient to produce these trial order effects, and that the particular kinds
of messages associated with rapid shifts of attention are not necessary.
7.2. Kinds of Approximations
The computationally-justified message passing scheme we developed, FBL,
uses the same class of approximations as Daw et al. (2008) used in their approx-
imation to the Kalman filter model, but the explanations differ in their details.
Both approaches are sequential updating algorithms that factorize the posterior
distribution after each trial, but the explanations of why the trial order effects
occur differ because of the different computational-level model structures. The
Kalman filter model uses a single layer to map input cues to outcomes and con-
ceptualizes attention as uncertainty about the weights. In contrast, FBL uses an
explicit module for activating attended cues before a second module maps the at-
tended cues to the outcome. The effect that factorizing the posterior distribution
has in each model differs as well. For FBL, the sequentially factorized poste-
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rior produces both the highlighting effect and the difference in strength between
forward and backward blocking. For the Kalman filter, factorizing the posterior
distribution produces highlighting, but causes backward blocking to disappear. In
order to produce both effects, interpolations were made between the sequentially
factorized posterior distribution that produces highlighting and the full posterior
distribution that produces backward blocking.
The effectiveness of LBL, FBL, and the Kalman filter approximations in trial
order effects has wider implications for how we attempt to build bridges between
computational- and algorithmic-level analyses. Other research has used sam-
pling algorithms from computer science and statistics to bridge computational-
and algorithmic-level analyses. This has been done in wide variety of areas, such
as categorization (Sanborn et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2010), sentence parsing (Levy
et al., 2009), prediction (Brown & Steyvers, 2009), perceptual bistability (Ger-
shman et al., 2012), and even human and animal learning (Lu et al., 2008; Ro-
jas, 2010) to explain trial order effects. Sampling algorithms tend to come with
asymptotic guarantees: with enough samples any computation done with these
algorithms will be indistinguishable from computation done with the full proba-
bility distribution. To allow for computational tractability and to produce devia-
tions from the computational-level model, far fewer samples are used. While in
some situations we can choose among sampling algorithms to best approximate
the posterior distribution (e.g., Fearnhead, 1998) and the number of samples that
best balances reward with opportunity cost can at times be computed (Vul et al.,
2009), the quality of approximation given by a sampling algorithm is generally
not made explicit.
In contrast, the approximations used in LBL, FBL, and the Kalman filter are
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all examples of sequential variational approximations. Instead of representing the
distribution with a series of points chosen stochastically from the true distribution,
variational approximations are deterministic and approximate a target distribution
by choosing a more tractable distribution as a stand in. In terms of trying to fit to
human data, variational approximations have the advantage of introducing biases
that can be explicitly justified by a divergence measure from the true distribution
given particular computational constraints. This opens up a new set of algorithms
that can be used for developing rational process models.
7.3. Factorization and Modularity
In addition to computational constraints, FBL incorporates the psychologi-
cal intuitions about modularity in the mind that motivated LBL. Intuitions about
modularity have taken many forms. Fodor (1983) gave criteria for evaluating the
strength of modularity in the mind. The form used here is very weakly modular,
because top-down information can have an effect which breaks Fodor’s property
of information encapsulation. Modularity has been supported for peripheral pro-
cesses, as envisioned by Marr (1982), though it has been found that in some cases
modularity is more of a useful heuristic than a complete description of separation
in visual processing (Schenk & McIntosh, 2010). Other researchers have proposed
modules for central processes, claiming with the “massive modularity” hypothe-
sis that there are task-specific modules, such as for cheater-detection (Carruthers,
2006; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). Still another proposal is that central modules
perform particular information-processing tasks, especially those that have been
identified by psychologists as underlying performance across a range of tasks
(Bechtel, 2003). LBL is appealing from this final viewpoint, dividing processes
along traditional psychological definitions of attention and learning.
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LBL and FBL both cast modules as factorized probability distributions that
are coordinated by statistically-motivated message passing – resulting in central
modules with extraordinary flexibility. Other computational approaches have ei-
ther worked out how to co-ordinate the output of peripheral modules (Bu¨lthoff
& Yuille, 1996) or cast modules as complete central procedures that are context-
dependent (Jacobs et al., 1991). Here we have introduced modularity that results
from sequential co-ordination of modules, and the use of message passing opens
up ideas for much more active and principled co-ordination between modules.
One interesting case of modularity is the case where factorization does no
harm: when the information is actually independent given the interpretation. For
example, participants could be given visual and auditory information in order to
estimate an object’s location. Here factorization does not result in the loss of
information because these sources are assumed to be independent. Interestingly,
participants in this task take into account information about the variability of the
cues, and give more weight to cues that are more reliable (Alais & Burr, 2004;
Ernst & Banks, 2002). This sort of result is more congruent with FBL than LBL,
because FBL passes along an entire distribution over outputs while LBL only
passes along the mean of a distribution without information about its variability.
7.4. Conclusions
Kruschke (2006b) introduced the idea that trial order effects that involve both
primacy and recency, such as highlighting, could be produced by using message
passing between locally Bayesian modules to approximate full Bayesian models.
Our work builds on this approach by developing a closely related alternative that
is computationally justified, can also predict human-like trial-order effects with
appropriate and not overly rapid shifts of attention, and may make better predic-
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tions for other experimental designs. Connections between existing models and
machine learning algorithms give cognitive scientists access to a rich resource
for developing alternative models that produce a range of behavior. Aside from
psychological and computational constraints, an exciting prospect is that other
constraints can be introduced by neural considerations. The approximations used
in the brain are still a new area of investigation, though some work has been done
on explaining neural activity using both variational (Friston, 2010; Gershman &
Wilson, 2010) and sampling explanations (Fiser et al., 2010). By constraining our
search it is hoped that the approximations used in the mind can be identified.
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Table 1: Canonical Highlighting Design
Phase Number of Trials Items
First 2∗N1 I.Pe→ E
Second 3∗N2 I.Pe→ E
1∗N2 I.Pl→ L
Third 1∗ (N2+N1) I.Pe→ E
3∗ (N2+N1) I.Pl→ L
Vandorpe, S., De Houwer, J., & Beckers, T. (2007). Outcome maximality and ad-
ditivity training also influence cue competition in causal learning when learning
involves many cues and events. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology,
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8. Appendix
In this appendix we provide a description of the design of the canonical high-
lighting experiment. The “canonical” design, shown in Table 1, equalizes the
number of I.Pe→ E and I.Pl→ L trials over the entire experiment. Within each
phase the trials were randomly ordered. We used a canonical design in which
N1 = 10 and N2 = 5, repeating the experiment 100 times for each model to aver-
age over order effects.
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Figure 2: Highlighting predictions for Globally Bayesian Learning (GBL), Locally Bayesian
Learning (LBL), and Factorized Bayesian Learning (FBL) for two experimental designs (explained
in the main text). Experimental results from Kruschke (2009) are plotted on each graph with cir-
cles. Error bars around the circles show 95% confidence intervals for the human data. The bar
plots show the model predictions of outcome E, where the line marks equal preference between
predictions of E and L. A standard set of input cues is tested in each model: the original training
sets of input cues I.Pe and I.Pl, as well as the critical tests of input cue I and input cues Pe.Pl.
Each set of model predictions was made using the same parameters as used in Kruschke (2006b)
for highlighting.
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Figure 3: Blocking predictions for Globally Bayesian Learning (GBL), Locally Bayesian Learning
(LBL), and Factorized Bayesian Learning (FBL). Each bar plot shows the strength of the B→ R
prediction after the control trials (C), after all of the forward blocking (FB) training trials, and after
all the backward blocking (BB) training trials. Each set of model predictions was made using the
same parameters as used in Kruschke (2006b) for highlighting.
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Figure 4: Example of a factorized distribution constructed from the marginals of a joint distri-
bution. Each cluster of nine boxes shows a joint probability distribution, where the probability
is equal to the area of a box (akin to a Hinton plot). The row of a box indexes the value of one
variable, while the column of the box indexes the value of a second variable. The bar plots are
marginal distributions of either the row or the column variable.
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Figure 5: Example comparison of the updating process of Globally Bayesian Learning (GBL)
and Factorized Bayesian Learning (FBL). Each cluster of nine boxes represents a joint probability
distribution, and probabilities are equal to the areas of the boxes (akin to a Hinton plot). The
column of a box indexes the setting of the first variable, while the row of the box indexes the
setting of the second variable. Within each gray area, GBL and FBL begin with the same prior
distributions and are updated with the same likelihoods. The left gray box shows the results of
updating GBL and FBL with a complex likelihood before a simple likelihood, while the right gray
box shows the results of updating GBL and FBL with the same likelihoods in the reverse order. At
the bottom of the figure, the final marginal distributions for each column are shown for FBL. The
difference plot at the bottom illustrates how sequential updating has produced order-dependent
marginals, with the vertical axis rescaled to emphasize the differences.
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Figure 6: Illustration of how the effects of highlighting arise from Factorized Bayesian Learning
(FBL). Each cluster of nine boxes shows a joint probability distribution, where the probability
is equal to the area of a box (akin to a Hinton plot). Each row within a cluster corresponds to
a different set of hypotheses about how the input cues activate the attended cues. Each column
within a cluster corresponds to how the attended cues activate the outcome. Each row of plots
corresponds to a different set of hypotheses. The first and second columns display the likelihoods
used in the first and second block of trials respectively. The third column displays the posterior
distributions of FBL following all training trials and the fourth column shows the final posterior
distributions again, but marginalized over the hypotheses about how input cues activate attended
cues.
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Figure 7: Illustration of how the effects of blocking arise from Factorized Bayesian Learning
(FBL). Each cluster of nine boxes shows a joint probability distribution, where the probability
is equal to the area of a box (akin to a Hinton plot). Each row within a cluster corresponds to
a different set of hypotheses about how the input cues activate the attended cues. Each column
within a cluster corresponds to how the attended cues activate the outcome. Each row of plots
corresponds to a different training order condition. The first and second columns display the
likelihoods used in the first and second block of trials respectively. The third column displays the
posterior distributions of FBL following all training trials and the fourth column shows the final
posterior distributions again, but marginalized over the hypotheses about how input cues activate
attended cues.
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Figure 8: Exclusive-OR (XOR) predictions for Globally Bayesian Learning (GBL), Locally
Bayesian Learning (LBL), and Factorized Bayesian Learning (FBL). Each bar plot shows the
probability of R prediction after testing with the single cues alone (T and U) or with the com-
pound cue (T.U). Each set of model predictions was made using the same parameters as used in
Kruschke (2006b) for highlighting.
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